Think-Tanks'Press

The economic necessity of reforming the PLAN so as to eventually protect China’s SLOCs (sea lines of communications) was evident, and the military necessity also became increasingly obvious as demonstrated by two events.

In 1988, scrimmages between China and Vietnam over the Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands highlighted the need for a navy capable of operating and fighting in the seas adjacent to China.

In 1991, the decisive and swift victory of the United States in the First Gulf War shook the Chinese military community – policy-makers and academics alike –: it not only accentuated the difference in military capabilities between China and the US, but also gave impetus to the speed of military reform in China.

It is likewise important to note that, currently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is in the second phase according to Liu’s plan. Moreover, it is evident that the PLAN’s modernization has been merged with the OBOR (“One Belt, One Road” Initiative), so that the goals of the two projects can mutually benefit one another.

The ambivalent position of Iran has led two different, and contrasting assessments. First assessment suggests that Iran is in partnership with PKK with regard to regional issues for a while. Accordingly, having assisted by PUK that has been long time friend of Tehran, Iran brokered an agreement between PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK and the Assad administration. Accordingly, Assad surrendered the north of Syria to PYD in return for its promise to avoid joining the Syrian opposition,and to suppress anti-regime protests in the region. As stated by Nuri Brimo, a member of Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), ‘PYD turned into gendarmerie of Assad and Iran’. That is, the declaration of autonomous or federal region by PYD is not beyond information and control of Iran. Moreover, the Assad administration and Iran have supported PYD both as part of their strategy to struggle against extremist ‘takfiri movements,’ and to prevent Turkey from mounting influence in the region.

Additionally, there is an apparent sympathy in Iranian media towards the Syrian Kurds, especially PYD. One of the reasons for that sympathy is the emergence of PYD as an ‘efficient’ actor that has been fighting against ‘takfiri terrorists’.  Second, a sense of consolidation with the Kurdsas part of ‘Irani’ peoples is prevalent in Iranian media, which boosted by ‘neo-Aryanist’ feelings. Additionally some people are advocates of building close relations with Kurdish movements in the region, for strategic reasons, in order to assure Kurdish support in future. Hence, relations between Iran and PYD/PKK are not only forced by contextual developments, but also shaped by strategic calculations.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is a central part of the EU’s engagement on migration.

It has generated both high aspirations and serious concerns regarding its aims, activities, and relationship to broader trends in migration and development policy.

The EUTF’s stated goal is to “address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration”, an aim that is widely seen as unrealistic.

However, key actors have other ambitions for the fund. These include demonstrating action on migration in response to political pressure, incentivising African cooperation on migration management, and using the fund’s flexibility to develop innovative programming.

Post the strikes of September 2016, a number of Pakistani hacker groups had attacked and defaced Indian websites. Times of India put the figure at over 7000. The damage or disruption however, was minor as the websites were academic, State Government, or institutional and penetration limited. What was however of concern was the attack on BSNL and MTNL networks which carry most of India’s official traffic. The potential of manipulation and disruption and damage is thus, considerable. This is further compounded by the fact that a very large proportion of the hardware is of Chinese origin, with the possibility of trap doors and other vulnerabilities.

India issued a Cyber Security Policy in 2013 and a Cyber Security Coordination Officer has been appointed at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The much awaited National Cyber Security Coordination Center (NCSCC) is yet to be set up. A number of organizations such as Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), NIC, NASSCOM, Data Security Council of India (DSCI) are working with respect to cyber security and there is some coordination. However given the challenges, number of agencies involved, tendency to work in silos and lack of trust, the field is open for mischief. In addition are inadequate staff and poor manning standards. In this fast changing domain, India lags far behind. The question simply is: ‘Has a Cyber 26/11 been planned for?’

A ‘Framework for the US-India Cyber Relationship’ was signed on 30 August 2016. While terror is not specifically mentioned, the text covers protection of critical infrastructure and measures for national security. A similar agreement was signed with Russia during the BRICS Summit in October 2016. Though the document is not public, it allows government agencies to work together on counter terrorism. Terror is a universal concern. Cooperation with like-minded countries specially, those which are threatened must become a priority. Expertise of countries such as Israel can be sought for the Indian scenario. It may also be advisable to reach out to nations like Taiwan, who have not only been targeted, but also understand the Han psychology. International cooperation also generates confidence building and deterrence value, as also consensus for global norms and conventions to protect non-combatants and citizen services.

The talks on creation of free trade zones with Serbia and Israel are ongoing.

It is still unclear what the EU’s reaction would be to Belgrade’s EEU plans, which in the current geopolitical context could be seen as further rapprochement with Russia, especially given the fact that Serbia refused to implement sanctions on Russia.

It would be the first case of a candidate country concluding a free trade agreement with the EEU, and experts are still debating the EU’s possible response. The agreement is unlikely to succeed if Belgrade faces considerable, explicit or implicit, constraints from the EU.  Within the context of Brexit and other European crises, some might find it rational for Belgrade to pursue multiple vectors of economic integration, especially in the Eurasian/Asian direction.

However, at the moment, both Brussels and Belgrade remain committed to the negotiation. It is not yet clear whether Serbia will be able to convince the EU that this agreement with the EEU is not “anti-European”. It will be Belgrade’s responsibility to prove that that managing both integration processes is not a zero-sum game.

In short, leading Republicans want the TPP and prefer that Trump try to fix it instead of rejecting it. And almost every major US farm and industry association supports the TPP.

Fixes to specific problems with TPP provisions cited by the pharmaceutical and financial services industries had been substantially completed by President Obama and USTR Michael Froman in anticipation of a vote on TPP implementing legislation during the lame-duck session of Congress after the election. Trump’s election abruptly stopped that legislative effort and the targeted revisions to TPP obligations. A new negotiation would allow improvements to be included in the core treaty text.

Reopening trade negotiations also allows the addition of new participants. Those that had been most interested in joining a high-standard Asia-Pacific pact included Korea, Taiwan, and Colombia. Inviting these countries to join the original TPP signatories in a broader Asia-Pacific trade initiative would provide several additional benefits.